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Abstract
Monitoring the job-search activities of unemployed workers is a common government
intervention. Typically, a caseworker reviews the unemployed workers employment con-
tacts at some frequency, and applies sanctions if certain requirements are not met. I model
monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework of Hopenhayn and Nicol-
ini (1997), where job-search e¤ort is private information for the unemployed worker. In
the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions
the unemployment benets. In the optimal monitoring scheme, endogenous sanctions and
rewards, together with random monitoring, create e¤ective job-search incentives for the un-
employed worker. I calibrate the model to the US economy and nd that the addition of
optimal monitoring to the optimal unemployment insurance scheme decreases the variance
of consumption by about two thirds and eliminates roughly half of the governments cost. I
also nd that compared with the optimal monitoring scheme, US states monitor too much
and impose the sanctions over too short a time span. For the US on average, shifting to the
optimal monitoring policy would generate savings of about $500 per unemployment spell.
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1 Introduction
Public spending on labor market policies was on average 1.6% of output in industrialized
countries in 2001 (OECD 2005). These labor market policies can be divided into passive
and active policies. Passive policies, such as constant benets to the unemployed, are
mainly concerned with the welfare of the unemployed worker, while active policies, such
as job-search monitoring and training, are mainly concerned with increasing the unem-
ployment exit rate. In the last three decades active labor market policies have gained a
higher share of the total spending on labor policies1 and have received increasing attention
as governments seek to insure unemployed workers without damaging their incentives for
becoming employed.
Given that additional policy instruments such as job-search monitoring are available
and are implemented by governments, it is important to model these instruments, to
examine to which extent these instruments increase the e¢ ciency of unemployment insur-
ance programs, and to compare existing policies to the optimal policy. This is a non-trivial
task since such instruments, as valuable as they may be, are also costly.
In practice, monitoring requires the unemployed worker to record his job-search activi-
ties, typically by listing the employers he contacted in a given period. At the employment
o¢ ce, a caseworker evaluates occasionally whether the job-search requirements are met,
e.g. by verifying that the contacts are authentic. If the caseworker nds the report un-
satisfactory, then she may impose sanctions, usually in the form of benetsreduction for
a limited period.
The rst objective of this paper is to model monitoring in the framework of optimal
unemployment insurance developed by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and to characterize
the optimal allocation in the presence of monitoring. In Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) a
1Between 1985 and 2001 the share of active labor market policies in OECD countries increased from
35% to 52% (OECD 2005).
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risk neutral planner, the government, insures a risk averse worker against unemployment
by setting transfers during unemployment and a wage tax or a subsidy during employment.
During unemployment, the worker searches for a job by exerting an e¤ort level which is his
private information. The rst best, had the information been observable to the planner,
is to deliver to the worker constant benets regardless of the employment status. Since,
however, the planner cannot observe the job-search e¤ort level, constant benets would
aw the workers incentives to search for a job. Therefore, to solve the incentive-insurance
trade-o¤, during unemployment benets should continuously decrease and the wage tax
upon re-employment should continuously increase.
I incorporate monitoring into the optimal unemployment insurance framework as fol-
lows. The planner monitors the unemployed worker with some history-dependent prob-
ability. When a worker is monitored, the planner pays a cost and receives a signal that
is correlated with the job-search e¤ort of the worker. The planner uses that signal to
improve the e¢ ciency of the contract by conditioning future payments and the wage tax,
not only on the employment outcome, but also on the signal. These future values create
endogenous sanctions and rewards, that together with the random monitoring, create ef-
fective job-search incentives: the worker exerts a high job-search e¤ort level in order to
increase the probability of a good signal, and consequently to increase the probability of
higher payments.
I nd that at the constrained optimum, the planner chooses for each type of unem-
ployed worker a specic combination of monitoring frequency and sanction severity: as
the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner monitors the unemployed more
frequently but imposes lower sanctions. This policy pattern is linked to the workers
risk aversion: as the generosity of the welfare system increases, the planner nds it more
costly to sanction the worker because the reward that is required to counterbalance a
given sanction increases with the level of promised utility; at the same time the cost of
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acquiring the monitoring signal is xed in units of consumption, and therefore the planner
shifts gradually from applying severe sanctions at a low probability to applying less severe
sanctions at a higher probability.
The second objective of the paper is to estimate the value of the additional instrument
of monitoring by comparing the results of the model to the results of a model where
monitoring technology is unavailable. I nd that when comparing the two models at a
balanced budget (zero net cost for the planner), monitoring decreases the variance of
consumption by about two thirds and eliminates roughly half of the governments cost of
the model without monitoring.
The third objective of the paper is to contrast the actual monitoring policy in the
US with the optimal scheme and assess the gain from shifting to the optimal scheme2.
Compared with the optimal monitoring scheme, US states monitor too much and im-
pose the sanctions over too short a time span. For the US on average, shifting to the
optimal monitoring policy would generate savings for the government of about $500 per
unemployment spell or a permanent increase in consumption for the unemployed of about
2%.
The e¤ect of job-search monitoring on labor market outcomes such as unemployment
duration is usually signicant and positive3. Johnson and Klepinger (1994) used random
assignment of unemployed workers to treatment groups that di¤ered in the job-search
requirements. They nd that waving the weekly requirement to record three contacts
increased the average unemployment spell by 3.3 weeks. Klepinger et al. (1997) nd that
increasing the number of required contacts from two to four decreased the average un-
employment spell by 5.9%, and that informing the unemployed workers that the contacts
2This exercise is quite di¤erent than the one presented in the second objective of the paper. There, the
comparison was between two unemployment insurance schemes, one with monitoring and one without.
The comparison here is between two policies that use the same technology (monitoring) di¤erently.
3Van den Berg et al. (2001) consider a model where the e¢ ciency of search is damaged because
unemployed workers substitute formal channels for informal channels. For adverse e¤ects of job search
assistance see Van den Berg (1994) and Fougere et al. (2005).
4
will be veried decreased the average unemployment duration by 7.5%.
The evidence on the e¤ects of sanctions is limited yet encouraging. In two empirical
studies that were conducted in the Netherlands, Van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring
et al. (2005) nd that the unemployment exit rate doubles following a sanction.
Job-search monitoring has been previously examined by several authors. Pavoni and
Violante (2007) consider monitoring as part of an optimal Welfare-to-Work program,
where the planner can perfectly observe the workers job-search e¤ort by paying some cost.
My model is more general in three ways. First, the monitoring signal is not necessarily
perfect. This generalization is desirable because it may be impossible for the planner
to extract the exact information on the workers job-search e¤ort. Furthermore, even if
extracting the exact information was possible, it might be very costly, and it may be
more e¢ cient for the planner to extract imperfect information on the job-search e¤ort for
a signicantly lower cost. Second, in Pavoni and Violante, when the planner chooses to
monitor, he does so with certainty, whereas the model presented here allows the planner
to optimally choose the frequency of monitoring. Finally, since the job-search e¤ort is
revealed to the planner, in Pavoni and Violante sanctions or rewards are never needed,
whereas here sanctions and rewards are key components of the optimal contract.
Boone et al. (2001) characterize the optimal monitoring policy in a general equilibrium
search model. They restrict "ad-hoc" the set of policies among which the optimal one is
chosen. First, the planner does not condition the benets on the workers history, and
second, the planner can only punish the worker by applying a xed decrease in benets for
the remaining unemployment spell. Their model, however, has the advantage of general
equilibrium which my model lacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model.
In Section 3, I calibrate the model to the US economy. In Section 4, I characterize the
optimal monitoring policy, estimate the value of monitoring, and compare the optimal
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and actual monitoring policies in the US. In Section 5, I conclude and discuss further
research.
2 The Model
2.1 The economy
Preferences: Workers have a period utility u (c) a where c is consumption, a is disutility
from job-search e¤ort or work, and u is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave. Workers discount the future at the discount factor .
Employment and Unemployment: The worker is either employed or unemployed.
During employment the worker exerts a constant e¤ort level ew, and receives a xed
periodic wage w: Employment is assumed to be an absorbing state4.
During unemployment, the worker searches for a job with an e¤ort level a 2 fel; ehg
that is either low or high and is private information of the worker. The unemployment
exit rate increases with the job-search e¤ort level j 2 fl; hg and is denoted by j. The
low job-search e¤ort is interpreted as not actively looking for a job, and therefore I set
el = 0 and l = 0: For brevity of notation, denote henceforth eh as e, and h as .
Monitoring technology: The monitoring probability  2 [0; 1] is a decision variable
of the planner. When the worker is monitored, the planner receives a signal on the workers
job-search e¤ort that is either good or bad, denoted by fg; bg respectively. The probability
of a good signal given job-search e¤ort j 2 fl; hg is j. The signal is only informative if
h 6= l, and I assume, without loss of generality, that h > l: This assumption implies
that given a good signal, the worker is more likely to have had exerted the high job-search
e¤ort, than the low job-search e¤ort.
4The assumption that employment is an absorbing state is widely used in the literature (e.g. Hopen-
hayn and Nicolini 1997, Pavoni 2006, and Pavoni and Violante 2007). This assumption allows us to
analyze one unemployment spell at a time, and does not a¤ect the qualitative characteristics of the
optimal policy.
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The cost of monitoring is  per period5, and it discourages the planner from setting
the monitoring frequency to 1 under all circumstances. Finally, the model assumes that
only one monitoring technology is available to the planner6.
Information structure: Both the worker and the planner observe the employment
state, the monitoring signal and the on-the-job e¤ort level7. However, only the worker
observes the job-search e¤ort level.
Timing: Figure 1 shows the timing of the model and the four possible outcomes at
the end of the period. At the beginning of each period, the planner delivers consumption
c to the worker. Then, the worker looks for a job with an e¤ort level ej, and nds a
job with probability j: If the worker becomes employed then the planner does not apply
monitoring8. If, on the other hand, the worker remains unemployed then he is monitored
with probability :When monitoring takes place, the planner pays the cost ; and receives
the signal s 2 fg; bg.
Figure 1 Approximately Here
Given the realizations of the employment state, monitoring, and the signal, the four
possible outcomes at the end of the period are: employment (e), unmonitored unemploy-
ment (n), monitored unemployment with a good signal (g), and monitored unemployment
with a bad signal (b).
5Given that the administrative institutions for unemployed workers already exist, I assume that mon-
itoring has no additional xed cost.
6This assumption can be easily relaxed by allowing the planner to choose a monitoring technology m
from the setM = i; ih; il	Ni=1 which includes N monitoring technologies.
7The assumption that the e¤ort level on-the-job is observed by the planner is used to simplify the
problem and does not have any qualitative e¤ect on the results. This assumption is standard in the optimal
unemployment insurance literature, e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni and Violante (2007).
Wang and Williamson (2002) consider the case where the workers e¤ort level a¤ects the probability of
transitions both from unemployment to employment and from employment to unemployment.
8When a worker becomes employed, it is clear to the planner that the worker exerted the high job-
search e¤ort (because the probability of nding a job associated with zero e¤ort is zero) and therefore
monitoring such a worker is never optimal.
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2.2 The planners problem
The optimal contract between the planner and the worker requires, in general, condition-
ing the benets and the wage tax on the entire history of the worker. Spear and Srivastava
(1987), Thomas and Worrall (1988), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), and Phelan
and Townsend (1991) found that all the relevant information for the recursive contract is
contained in a one-dimensional object. In the monitoring recursive contract, as in the un-
employment insurance contract, this one-dimensional state of the worker is the expected
discounted utility U promised to the worker at the beginning of each period. At the end of
each period, this value is updated according to the outcomes and is therefore governed by
all the relevant information in the workers history. Although this state is not a primitive
of the model, using it makes the problem easier to solve, and once the model is solved the
state is used to back out the allocation for each type of worker.
In what follows, I present the planner problems during employment and during unem-
ployment.
2.2.1 The planners problem during employment
LetW (U) be the value for the planner from an employed worker who has promised utility
U: The planners problem during employment is:
W (U) = max
c;Ue
 c+ w + W (Ue) (1)
s:t: :
U = u (c)  ew + Ue
where U e is the future promised utility contingent on employment. If c > w then the
planner delivers the di¤erence to the worker as a wage subsidy and if c < w then the
planner extracts the di¤erence as a wage tax. The constraint in the problem, commonly
known as the promise keeping constraint, states that the expected utility for the worker
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given current consumption, disutility from work, and discounted future promised utility,
has to deliver, in expected terms, the utility U that was promised to the worker at the
beginning of the period.
Given the absence of moral hazard, the solution to the employment problem is full
insurance and constant benets, which implies a constant wage tax or subsidy.
2.2.2 The planners problem during unemployment
For an unemployed worker, the planner chooses for each possible state six variables: con-
sumption c, monitoring probability , and four continuation values, one for each possible
outcome: employment U e, unmonitored unemployment Un, monitored unemployment
with a good signal U g, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal U b. In addition to
these six decisions, the planner recommends a job-search e¤ort level9. When the planner
recommends a high job-search e¤ort level, he needs to support this recommendation by
making it worthwhile for the worker to exert the high job-search e¤ort. This is achieved
by the incentive compatibility constraint that guarantees that the expected utility for a
worker who exerts the high job-search e¤ort is at least as high as that of a worker who
exerts the low job-search e¤ort10.
Let V (U) be the value for the planner, who recommends the high job-search e¤ort,
from an unemployed worker who has promised utility U . The problem of that planner
9If the planner recommends the low e¤ort level then there is no need to set incentives and the solution
is constant benets and a constant wage tax. This solution can be achieved because while  > 0, the
probability of nding a job associated with zero e¤ort is zero. Therefore the planner knows that a worker
who received a job o¤er must have searched for a job with a high e¤ort level. The planner can use
this observation to apply a punishment severe enough to discourage workers from not following the low
job-search e¤ort recommendation.
10For high enough values of promised utility, creating incentives by spreading future promised utilities
is too costly and the planner recommends low job-search e¤ort and implements full insurance (Pavoni
and Violante (2007) refer to this state as Social Assistance). In the current calibration social assistance
is optimal only for very high values of promised utility (associated with constant consumption that are
higher than the gross wage). In the simulations the promised utility values of the workers are always
lower than these values. Therefore, and in order to fully characterize the optimal monitoring policy, I
describe the monitoring policy as if creating incentives for the worker to extract the high job-search e¤ort
is always desirable.
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during unemployment is:
V (U) = max
c;Ue;Ug;Ub;Un;
 c+  W (Ue) + (1 )(1  )V (Un) +   + hV (Ug) + (1  h)V (U b)		
s:t: :
U = u (c)  e+ Ue +  (1  ) (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b (2)
U  u (c) +  (1  )Un +   lUg + (1  l)U b
where the objective function includes: the cost of consumption payments to the worker;
the discounted value of employment at future promised utility U e; the discounted value
of unmonitored unemployment; and the discounted value of monitored unemployment.
Note that when monitoring is applied the cost of monitoring  is included.
The rst constraint is the promise keeping constraint and the second constraint is
the incentive compatibility constraint discussed earlier. Note that since the probability
of nding a job associated with zero e¤ort is zero, the right-hand-side of the incentive
compatibility constraint does not include an employment possibility.
I now discuss the trade-o¤s in the planners problem, and their intuitive e¤ects on the
solutions properties:
 Monitoring frequency. As the monitoring frequency () increases, the planner re-
ceives more information but pays a higher cost. Due to this trade-o¤, the planner
will choose, in general, an interior point for . We expect the planner to choose
a higher monitoring frequency the higher the e¢ ciency of monitoring is. This ef-
ciency increases when either h increases, l decreases, or both (more accurate
information) and when  decreases (less costly information).
 Sanctions and rewards. While an unmonitored unemployed worker is promised a
lifetime utility of Un, the same worker, when monitored, is promised a lifetime utility
of either U g or U b depending on the signal. Therefore, it is intuitive to dene the
di¤erence in promised utility relative to unmonitored promised utility (U g   Un,
and Un   U b) as the workers reward and sanction in utility terms, respectively.
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It can be shown, by manipulating the rst order conditions of the planners problem
(see Appendix A), that the three values, Un; U g, and U b are closely related in the
optimal solution as follows:
V 0 (Un) = hV 0 (Ug) + (1  h)V 0
 
U b

(3)
Hence, the carrot (the reward) and the stick (the sanction) balance each other in the
optimal contract: the planner has to compensate the unemployed worker more, the
higher the sanction is. Given that a typical value of h is close to 1.0, as will be shown
in the calibration, the severity of the sanction is expected to be signicantly higher
than the generosity of the reward. In other words, a monitored unemployed worker
expects to receive a small reward with a high probability and a severe sanction with
a low probability.
 Monitoring frequency versus sanctions and rewards. The planner sets the decision
variables in the problem in accordance with the incentive compatibility constraint.
In particular, the planner can magnify the e¤ect of monitoring in two ways: he
could increase the probability of monitoring, or he could increase both the reward
and the sanction. Given that h > l, either of these two methods would be helpful
in increasing the expected utility that the unemployed worker is promised when
exerting a high job-search e¤ort relative to that of the low job-search e¤ort. We
will see that the planner chooses a particular combination of the probability of
monitoring (the intensity of the policy) and the magnitude of the reward and the
sanction (the extensiveness of the policy), depending on the unemployment workers
state (U). I will discuss this choice in details in the results section.
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3 Calibration
The calibration of the parameters that are not related to the monitoring technology fol-
lows Pavoni and Violante (2007). The unit of time is set to one month, and preferences
are log utility in consumption. The monthly discount factor  is set to 0.9959 to match
an annual interest rate of 5%. Using CPS data, monthly earnings, w; are set to $1,540,
which is the median monthly wage for workers with at most a high-school diploma, and
the employment exit rate, ; is set to 0:22, which is the conditional average of the un-
employment hazard rate. The disutility of work e¤ort, ew, which equals the disutility of
job-search e¤ort, e, is equal to 0:6711:
The remaining parameters that need to be calibrated are those that characterize the
monitoring technology: the monitoring cost , and the probabilities of a good signal given
high and low job-search e¤ort h and l, respectively.
The monitoring cost  is based on data from The Minnesota Family Investment Pro-
gram (2000), where each caseworker was responsible for 100 clients, and among other
tasks, documented client activities, applied sanctions, and assisted with housing. Based
on monthly gross earnings of $3,000 per caseworker12 and the caseload described above,
the value of  is $30 per month per monitoring of an unemployed worker. This value
is an upper bound because the caseworkers were also engaged in activities other than
monitoring.
The probabilities of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort levels (h; l)
are determined simultaneously13 by the following parameters: the monthly monitoring
frequency
 
ACT

of 0.20 (see Appendix B); the monthly probability of sanctions () of
3:3% (Grubb 2000); and the measure of unemployed workers who exert a high job-search
11This value is based on a labor share of 0.60, a consumption-income ratio of 0.75, and a fraction of
time worked of 0.3 (see Cooley 1995).
12The median of annual earnings for Community and Social Services Occupations in the US is $36,390
(Department of Labor, 2006).
13The probability of a good signal given a low job-search e¤ort (l) is a source of imperfection that
occurs, for example, due to an administrative failure or due to over-generosity of the caseworker.
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e¤ort14 (), as follows:
 = ACT  (  (1  h) + (1  )  (1  l))
The lower bound of h = 0:83 is achieved by assuming that  = 1. This assumption is
unrealistic since it implies that all the sanctions that workers experience in the US are
unjustied and only happen due to the inaccuracy of the monitoring signal.
The upper bound of h = 1 is achieved for a wide variety of combinations of ; and l
(e.g. l = 0:2, and  = 0:80): Since the lower bound is unrealistic, and the upper bound is
plausible for a wide variety of combinations of parameters I set h = 0:95 and l = 0:20.
The sensitivity analysis at the end of the results section covers values of h 2 [0:85; 1:00]
and l 2 [0:00; 0:80] :
Table 1 lists the parameters of the model.
Table 1 Approximately Here
4 Results
The results of the model are organized as follows. First, I discuss the characteristics of
the optimal monitoring policy. Then, I estimate the value of monitoring by comparing
the current model to a model without monitoring technology and do a sensitivity analysis
with respect to the key parameters of monitoring. At the end of the section, I compare
the actual monitoring policy in the US with the optimal monitoring scheme. The solution
method is described in details in the computational appendix.
14The unemployment insurance scheme in the model is such that workers always exert the high-e¤ort.
In the actual monitoring policy this is not necessarily the case due to heterogeneity in preferences, the
fact that some of the US states do not monitor at all (see Appensix B), and other reasons.
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4.1 Optimal monitoring policy
I assume that the government announces the optimal policy at time zero and commits
itself to it. This assumption eliminates policies in which the planner deviates from the an-
nounced policy (e.g. the government does not monitor ex-post) and workers update their
beliefs according to the observed government policy15. Given the commitment assump-
tion, the question of whether the planner should monitor or not, need only be examined
ex-ante: if the addition of monitoring improves the e¤ectiveness of the contract then the
government should use monitoring and follow the monitoring scheme.
The optimal contract, given the commitment assumption, is described recursively by
six functions

c; U e; U g; U b; Un; 
	
, each depending on the state variable U . I start with
two standard results in the optimal unemployment insurance literature (e.g. Pavoni and
Violante 2007). First, the optimal consumption level (c) is increasing and convex in
promised utility. Consumption increases in promised utility because, given the workers
desire for consumption smoothing, it is optimal for the planner to translate higher levels
of promised utility into higher levels of consumption. The convexity of consumption in
promised utility corresponds to the concavity of the utility function, which means that
relatively more consumption is required to support a given increase in promised utility.
Second, since the planner is risk neutral, the upward slope and the convexity of con-
sumption in promised utility imply that as promised utility increases, consumption in-
creases both in absolute and relative terms. Therefore, the value function of the planner
is downward slope and concave in promised utility.
The next result refers to the mapping of current promised utility to next periods
promised utility, conditional on labor market outcomes. In the optimal contract, the four
futures values, corresponding to the four possible outcomes, endogenously create implicit
15The commitment assumption is typical in the unemployment insurance literature, e.g. Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni and Violante (2007). There, too, the planner never deviates from the
declared scheme.
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rewards and punishments for creating e¤ective incentives for the worker to exert the high
job-search e¤ort.
Figure 2 shows the mapping of the state across periods in utility units by outcome.
The horizontal axis is the promised utility at the beginning of the period and the vertical
axis is the next periods promised utility by outcome. The four future promised utilities in
the gure are ordered as follows: U e; U g; Un; U b: upon employment, an outcome that can
only happen in the model if the worker exerts a high job-search e¤ort, promised utility
increases; upon monitoring with a good signal, the worker receives a reward that is only
slightly lower than that of employment16; upon unmonitored unemployment, the planner
receives little information on the workers e¤ort level and therefore the promised utility
changes only slightly; nally, upon monitoring with a bad signal the worker experiences a
severe decrease in promised utility, implying that the planner nds the bad signal infor-
mative and helpful in creating the necessary incentives. This result follows the relation
between Un; U g; and U b (3), which states that the sanction level is signicantly higher
than the reward17.
Figure 2 Approximately Here
The increase of the continuation values with the desirability of the outcomes fb; n; g; eg
is consistent with the monotone likelihood ratio property, which states that the second
best consumption is correlated with the relative likelihood of an implemented e¤ort rather
than the lower levels of e¤ort (see for example Zhao 200118), i.e. consumption is higher for
16For a CRRA utility with a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of two, I nd that Ug is very close
(from above) to Un. Thus, the quantitative result depends on the parameters. Pavoni (2007) nds a
closed form solution to the model without monitoring, an approach that provides analytical properties
of the promised utility values, but is too cumbersome for the problem here, which includes six decision
variables.
17The relevant ratio in (3), h1 h ; is equal to 19 in the current calibration.
18Zhao (2001) assumes that the likelihood ratio increases with productivity. Here, the necessary as-
sumption for the monotone likelihood ratio property is: p(e;eh)p(e;el) >
p(g;eh)
p(g;el)
> p(n;eh)p(n;el) >
p(b;eh)
p(b;el)
. This
condition is guaranteed as long as h > l:
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outcomes where the ratio between the probability of an outcome given the high job-search
e¤ort and the probability of the same outcome given a low job-search e¤ort, is higher.
We now move to discuss the sanction and the monitoring frequency decisions. Dene
the relative consumption sanction as the fraction by which benets decrease relative to
the benets level of unmonitored unemployment19. Figures 3 and 4 show, respectively,
the relative consumption sanction and the monitoring frequency by promised utility. The
relative consumption sanction, which is a permanent decrease in consumption, varies a
lot across promised utility, ranging roughly from 9% to 2%. The monitoring frequency
varies a lot as well, ranging from 2% to 14%. Keeping everything else xed, the lower the
relative consumption sanction is, the higher the monitoring frequency should be to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint.
Figures 3 and 4 Approximately Here
When combined, these two characteristics imply that as the generosity of the wel-
fare system increases, the planner monitors the unemployed more frequently but imposes
more moderate sanctions. This result is consistent with the observation of Boone et al
(2001) that when comparing the monitoring policies of the US and Sweden, the number
of sanctions is inversely related to the severity of the penalty.
The dynamics of the monitoring frequency and the relative consumption sanction are
rooted in the concavity and downward-slope properties of the planners value function.
These properties imply that as the promised utility increases, the cost of spreading out
the future promised values (i.e. the cost of providing incentives through sanctions and
rewards) increases as well. Since the monitoring cost is independent of the promised utility
level, the cost of the sanction relative to the cost of applying monitoring increases with
promised utility and the planner substitutes sanctions with more frequent monitoring.
19The relative consumption sanction is di¤erent from the sanction dened earlier, which refers to the
absolute decrease in the lifetime expected discounted utility.
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Quantitatively, however, the optimal monitoring scheme is fairly insensitive to changes
in promised utility that rise either from changes in the generosity of the welfare system or
from changes in promised utility along the unemployment path. The planner can therefore
use a relatively simple monitoring scheme with a xed monitoring frequency and a xed
sanction that would deliver almost the same gains as the optimal one.
4.2 The value of monitoring
Figure 5 shows the di¤erence in US$ between the planners values for the policies with and
without monitoring20. Monitoring is relatively more e¢ cient at high levels of promised
utility because as promised utility increases, spreading out future values, a necessary
feature of optimal unemployment insurance schemes, becomes more costly. Thus, at
low levels of promised utility (U), the optimal monitoring policy resembles the optimal
unemployment insurance.
Figure 5 Approximately Here
Since the savings due to monitoring varies signicantly across the state, it is of interest
to measure the savings at the level of promised utility that balances the governments
budget. The balanced budget point is U0 such that V (U

0 ) = 0. This is the level of
promised utility for which the costs of benets, wage subsidies and monitoring are exactly
covered by the tax revenues21. At U0 (for the model with no monitoring) the addition of
monitoring saves $25 per unemployment spell.
The low absolute saving does not indicate that monitoring is ine¤ective but that it is
caused by a low potential for savings in the current framework. This low potential for
savings follows the fact that the optimal unemployment insurance scheme already uses
20The model with no monitoring is very close to the model used in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
The main di¤erence is that in Hopenhayn and Nicolini the job-search e¤ort level is continuous and not
discrete. I use a discrete level of e¤ort in both models for consistency.
21This point is unique because V (U) is strictly monotone in U , .
17
all the relevant information in the workers history. In order to get a better perspective
of the potential of monitoring, it is useful to compare the savings induced by the use of
monitoring to the maximum savings associated with the rst best case, i.e. when the
planner observes the job-search e¤ort level and the allocation is constant consumption
across time and states. I refer to the di¤erence between the value of the rst best and
that of the optimal unemployment insurance scheme as the total cost of moral hazard.
The saving due to monitoring as a fraction of the total moral hazard cost at the balanced
budget point is equal to roughly half. This shows that monitoring is a useful policy
instrument for lowering the moral hazards cost intrinsic in the unemployment insurance
problem.
4.2.1 What makes monitoring an e¤ective policy
The reduction in the planners cost due to monitoring is achieved by consumption smooth-
ing. To demonstrate this, I simulate the consumption paths for the optimal unemployment
insurance model and for the monitoring model. Figure 6 shows three examples of con-
sumption paths following the two policies. In each example, the worker starts o¤ as
unemployed at a promised utility level of U0 , stays unemployed for 5 periods and then
nds a job. In the top panel, monitoring is applied in periods 2,3 and 4 and in each
monitoring event the signal is good. In the middle panel, there is no monitoring. In the
bottom panel, monitoring is applied once, in period 2, and results with a bad signal.
Figure 6 Approximately Here
Consumption in the unemployment insurance model, where the planner has only two
outcomes to condition on, decreases monotonically, and then increases signicantly when
the worker nds a job. These shifts in consumption are required for creating the necessary
incentives for the unemployed worker to look for a job with a high e¤ort. In contrast,
consumption in the monitoring model varies very little, except for the third panel where
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the worker was sanctioned. Note, also, that a sanction is relatively a rare event that
happens only when both monitoring and a bad signal happen. The probability of such
event is   (1  h) ; which is around 0:3% at the balanced budget point.
The simulation shows that thanks to the additional information regarding the job-
search e¤ort, monitoring allows the planner to smooth the unemployed workers consump-
tion. Simulating the model over 60 periods and 5,000 workers shows that the variance of
consumption in the monitoring model is only one third of the variance of consumption in
the model without monitoring.
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The comparison between the models with and without monitoring relies on the e¢ ciency
of monitoring, which in turn relies on the three parameters of the monitoring technology:
the probabilities of a good signal given high and low job-search e¤ort h; l, respectively,
and the monitoring cost . In order to examine the robustness of the savings to these
parameters I analyze the response of savings at the balanced budget point to various
values of these parameters.
The probability of a good signal given the high job-search e¤ort h determines the value
of the information extracted by applying monitoring. As h, the planner receives more
accurate information on the workers job-search e¤ort level and is therefore encouraged
to monitor more frequently. Furthermore, as h increases, the probability of a sanction
decreases and the planner can use more severe sanctions to encourage the unemployed
worker to exert the high job-search e¤ort. In the extreme case when h = 1 it is possible
to get arbitrarily close to the rst best allocation by using a combination of very low
monitoring frequency (that costs very little) with an extremely severe punishment that
will never be applied but will still ensure that the worker exerts the high e¤ort.
Table 2 presents the savings at the balanced budget point for various levels of h.
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Holding l and  xed, as h increases increases beyond the benchmark value, the e¢ ciency
of monitoring increases as expected. As h decreases, the savings level decreases sharply
and at a value of h = 0:85 (close to the unlikely lower bound) the savings is only 23%.
Table 2 Approximately Here
The sensitivity analysis of l in Table 3 shows that monitorings e¢ ciency depends on
the di¤erence between the precision of the two signals (h; l). As l gets closer to h the
savings decrease signicantly.
Table 4 shows the savings for various values of the monitoring cost . First, note
that when  = 0 the rst best is not achieved. This happens because in the model free
monitoring does not imply that the e¤ort is observable due to the imperfection of the
signal22. Second, as the cost of monitoring increases, the planner nds that the price of
the signal becomes more and more costly. As a result, the planner uses monitoring less
frequently and the level of savings decreases.
4.3 Budget savings
In this section I compare the cost of the optimal monitoring scheme with the cost of the
actual monitoring policy implemented in the US. The actual policy in the US includes
three types of payments: a net wage for an employed worker, net benets for an unem-
ployed worker who is not sanctioned, and a sanction for an unemployed worker who is
caught shirking.
The rst two types of payments are calibrated based on a labor tax level of 0:29
(Mendoza et al 1994) and a replacement rate of 0:55 (OECD 2006). The calibration
of the sanction is based on the sanction in the US, which is a complete loss of benets
22The rst best can only be achieved when there is no asymmetric information. When  = 0, the
planner monitors with probability 1.0 but since the signal is imperfect, the planner cannot know for sure
what the job-search e¤ort level was. Therefore, the planner still needs to condition the promised utility
on outcomes that will happen in equilibrium, which is costly.
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for one week (Grubb 2000). I assume, however, that some consumption smoothing is
possible within a month, for example by using local networks, and model the sanction
as a decrease of 23% in the net benets23. These parameters, together with the monthly
earnings calibrated earlier, imply a net wage of $1; 093, net benets of $601, and benets
net of sanction of $451.
Unlike the benets levels, which are fairly consistent across states in the US, the
monthly monitoring frequency in the US varies signicantly and ranges from 0 to 0:67.
For the calibration of the actual policy, I use the average of 0.20 (see Appendix B for
more details on the monitoring frequency in the US).
Figure 7 shows the levels of consumption for both the optimal and actual policies
for a worker who starts unemployed and goes through the following states: fn; g; n; b; eg.
The top panel shows both policies on the same wide vertical scale. The bottom panel
shows the optimal policy on a tighter vertical scale in order to emphasize those variations
in consumption that cannot be visualized in the top panel. The sharp changes in con-
sumption in the actual policy, where the planner conditions only on the current state, are
replaced by quite moderate changes in the optimal policy, where the planner conditions
consumption on the complete history of the agent. Specically, the one time decrease of
23% in the monthly benet in the actual policy is replaced by a persistent decrease of
only 5% in the optimal policy.
Figure 7 Approximately Here
In order to estimate quantitatively the budget savings of moving from the actual policy
to the optimal policy I simulate both policies as follows. First, I simulate 5; 000 workers
across T = 60 months according to the actual policy in the US to nd the average cost
for the planner and the expected utility delivered to the worker for the T periods. Then,
I x an initial level of promised utility in the optimal policy to match the same level of
23This is the share of one week in a month. It is equal to one over the ratio of 52 weeks over 12 months.
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expected utility as in the actual policy. Finally, I simulate the optimal scheme and nd its
cost. The di¤erence between the two costs is the gain for the planner from applying the
optimal policy in the US24. Shifting to the optimal monitoring policy in the US would save
$521 per unemployed worker per unemployment spell. These savings can be translated
into an increase of 1:8% in consumption over time T 25.
To sum up, compared with the optimal monitoring scheme, US states monitor too
much on average (20% compared with 8%) and impose the sanctions over too short a
time span26.
5 Concluding remarks
Governments monitor the job-search activities of unemployed workers in order to increase
the e¢ ciency of unemployment insurance: they randomly monitor job-search e¤ort and
receive, at a cost, a signal of the e¤ort level. This additional information plays an impor-
tant role in the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
This paper uses, for the rst time, the recursive contracts framework to model moni-
toring of job-search activities and to solve for the optimal policy. This framework allows
to characterize the optimal monitoring policy, to evaluate the gain from using the ad-
ditional technology, and to compare the cost and characteristics of the actual policy to
those of the optimal policy.
The quantitative results in this paper are based on the calibration of the model to the
US economy. There are, however, striking di¤erences in the characteristics of the actual
policies across the US states. Unlike the benets levels that are fairly consistent across
24To be more precise, this is the savings for unemployment spells of up to 60 months. The measure of
unemployed workers after 60 months is, however, negligible.
25The constant consumption increase is a fraction of  1
T 1 of the savings. The consumption increase
is equal to that constant consumption over the average consumption over time T .
26Some countries indeed spread the sanctions out: e.g. in Australia the job-search sanction is a decrease
of 18% of the benets level for a duration of 26 weeks (Grubb 2000).
22
the states, the monthly monitoring frequency varies signicantly and ranges from 0.00 to
0.67 (see Appendix B). These signicant di¤erences cannot be easily explained within the
framework of the model, and imply that the e¢ ciency of the monitoring policy can be
increased more signicantly for some states than for others. Using an extended version
of the model presented here, with US states specic parameters, can shed light on the
causes for the di¤erences in policies as well as the potential to improve the e¢ ciency of
the policy for each state.
In addition to the variation in the characteristics of the actual use of monitoring across
US states, there are also signicant di¤erences across countries in all the main charac-
teristics of the policy: the monitoring frequency; the sanctionsfrequency; the sanction
duration; and the sanction severity (Grubb 2000). Here, too, an extended model could
reveal whether the variation in policies follows variation in labor market environments or
some ine¢ ciencies.
As pointed out by Abdulkadiroglu et al (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008), al-
lowing the workers to hold unobservable savings may signicantly a¤ect the results. It is
important, however, to keep in mind that while the target population of unemployment
insurance is very diverse, monitoring is targeted at long term unemployed workers, whose
savings are signicantly lower than those of the median worker.
Heterogeneity can be introduced into the model in several ways. The most direct way
is to introduce heterogeneity in wages. This would allow conditioning the initial level of
promised utility on the wage of each type of worker as applied in most OECD countries.
This heterogeneity in wages would reduce and possibly eliminate the result that for high
levels of promised utilities the planner recommends a low job-search e¤ort: once high
levels of promised utilities will be associated with high wages, the gain from employment
to the planner will dominate the cost of setting the incentives for the high job-search
e¤ort.
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Alternatively, heterogeneity can be introduced through several types of workers, each
with a specic level of disutility from job-search e¤ort. Assuming that the type is unknown
to the planner27, the planner can design customized contracts that would only appeal to
one or some specic types
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APPENDIX A: COMPUTATIONAL METHOD
This appendix describes the solution method for the problem of a planner who recom-
mends the high job-search e¤ort during unemployment28.
We begin by transforming the maximization problem with six decision variables and
two constraints into a maximization problem with four decision variables and no con-
straints. To do this, start by writing the incentive compatibility constraint as follows29:
u (c) e+Ue+ (1  ) (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b = u (c)+ (1  )Un +   lUg + (1  l)U b
and express U e in terms of Un; U g; U b and  :
Ue=
e

+(1  )Un 


[(1  ) h   l]Ug + [(1  ) (1  h)  (1  l)]U b
	
(4)
Then, use the promise keeping constraint to express c in terms of U e; Un; U g; U b and  :
c = u 1

U + e   Ue + (1  )  (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b	 (5)
Then, use (4) in the RHS of (5) to express the consumption level (c) in terms of Un; U g; U b
and : Substitute this value of c and the value for U e from (4) into (2) to receive the
maximization problem with four decision variables: Un; U g; U b and ; with no constraints.
These four remaining decision variables consist of three continuation values (Un; U g; U b)
and the monitoring frequency . While the support for the continuation values is, in gen-
eral, the real line, the support for the monitoring frequency, , is obviously [0; 1]. This
closed support presents a computational challenge, which I overcome by distcritizing the
support of the monitoring frequency into 101 values30 and then solve the maximization
problem for each of these 101 values.
28In absence of asymmetric information, the solution to the employment problem consists of constant
benets for the complete duration of employment.
29In the optimal solution, the incentive compatibility constraint always holds with equality. This is the
case simply because delivering an expected discounted utility that is higher than the required one, costs
more.
30The sensitivity of the solution is, therefore, 0:5% of monitoring frequency.
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Thus, the maximization problem is reduced to three continuous variables: Un; U g; U b:
The solution to this problem is based on the three rst order conditions (FOCs) with
respect to Un,U g, and U b respectively:
 
u 1
0
(c_arg)+W 0 (Ue) + (1  )V 0(Un) = 0 
u 1
0
(c_arg) l W 0 (Ue) ((1  ) h   l) + (1  )hV 0(Ug) = 0 
u 1
0
(c_arg) (1  l) W 0 (Ue) ((1  ) (1  h)  (1  l)) + (1  ) (1  h)V 0(U b) = 0
where I have dened for brevity of notation:
c_arg = U + e   Ue + (1  )  (1  )Un +   hUg + (1  h)U b
APPENDIX B: THE ACTUAL MONITORING POLICY IN THE US
Denote by A the actual labor tax rate, by A the actual replacement rate, and by A
the percent decrease in net benets for a sanctioned worker. The three levels of payments
under the actual policy in the US are31: net wage w (1  ), net benets b = wA (1  ),
and benets net of sanction of b= wA (1  )  1  A : The state of the unemployed
worker in the actual policy is his last periods status s 2 fu; pg for unemployed, and
penalized (sanctioned) respectively. Let W be the value for an employed worker and let
V (s) be the value for an unemployed worker. The unemployed worker faces a discrete
decision of the job-search e¤ort level as follows:
V (s)= max
a2f0;eg
8<: u (cs) +  f(1  )V (u) +  [lV (u) + (1  l)V (p)]g ; e+ u (cs) +  fW + (1  ) f(1  )V (u) +  [hV (u) + (1  h)V (p)]gg
9=;
31Note that in the actual policy there are only 3 possible outcomes and not 4 as in the model. This is
because there are no awards in the actual policy for monitored unemployment with a good signal. Given,
however, the proximity of Ug and Un in the results, the lack of this additional outcome does not seem to
be crucial to the design of the actual policy.
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where I have used the assumption that a worker who exerts a low job-search e¤ort stays
unemployed, and where:
cs =
8<: b if s = ub if s = p
9=;
The value of an employed worker is:
W =
u (w (1  ))  ew
1  
The calibration of the actual monthly monitoring probability in the US, ACT , is
based on the frequency of required reports (of employment contacts) that the unemployed
workers ll in and on the probability that these contacts are veried. While the weekly
frequency of reports is fairly consistent across states (OLeary 2004), the probability or
verifying these contacts varies vastly across states: some states (e.g. Pennsylvania) do
not monitor at all; some states (e.g. Washington) have a target monitoring frequency of
10%; and some states (e.g. South Dakota) consistently review contacts every 4-6 weeks
(DOL 2003).
In addition to the vast variance in the probability of verifying contacts across states,
the information is also usually vague, possibly because it is of the interest of states to
conceal the actual probability of verifying contacts. As a benchmark for the probability of
verifying employment contacts in the US I use a conservative value of 5% (the lower this
probability the lower h), which determines, together with a weekly frequency of reports,
a monthly monitoring probability
 
ACT

of 20%32.
32The unemployed worker submits 52=12 = 4 13 reports a year. The probability of being monitored at
least once in a month is: 1   0:954:33 = 0:20, where 0.95 is the probability of not being monitored in a
given week.
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TABLE 1
Calibration parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Wage w $1,540
Monitoring cost  $30
Disutility from exerting high job-search e¤ort e; ew 0.67
Discount factor  0.9959
Unemployment exit rate  0.22
The probability of a good signal given a high e¤ort h 0.95
The probability of a good signal given a low e¤ort l 0.20
The actual monitoring policy in the US
Monitoring frequency 0.20
Net wage $1,093
Net benets $601
Benets net of sanction $451
TABLE 2
Sensitivity analysis for the value of h
h 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99 1.00
Savings 0.23 0.36 0.54 0.79 1.00
TABLE 3
Sensitivity analysis for the value of l
l 0.0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
Savings 0.62 0.54 0.41 0.19 0.00
TABLE 4
Sensitivity analysis for the value of 
 ($) 0 10 30 50 100
Savings 0.94 0.71 0.54 0.43 0.27
*Fraction of the moral hazard cost
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Fig. 1. The timing of the model and the four possible end-of-period outcomes: employment,
unmonitored unemployment, monitored unemployment with a good signal, and monitored un-
employment with a bad signal.
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Fig. 2. The mapping of promised utility from the current period to the next period, con-
ditioned on the four possible outcomes: employment, unmonitored unemployment, monitored
unemployment with a good signal, and monitored unemployment with a bad signal. The values
for employment and monitoring with a good signal are above the diagonal (the diagonal itself is
not illustrated) and include a reward. The value for unmonitored unemployment is only slightly
below the diagonal. Finally, the value for monitored unemployment with a bad signal is low due
to the sanction.
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Fig. 3. The relative consumption sanction by promised utility.
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Fig. 4. The monitoring frequency by promised utility. As the generosity of the welfare system
increases, the monitoring frequency increases and the relative consumption sanction (Fig. 3)
decreases.
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Fig. 5. The value function gap in US$ between the optimal monitoring and optimal unemploy-
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Fig. 6. Simulated consumption paths according to optimal and actual monitoring policies. The
consumption paths for the unemployment insurance policy are identical. The consumption paths
for the monitoring policy depends on whether monitoring was applied and the signals result.
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Fig. 7. Consumption according to the optimal and actual monitoring policies in the US for an
unemployed worker who has the following sequence of outcomes: unmonitored unemployment,
monitored unemployment with a good signal, unmonitored unemployment, monitored unem-
ployment with a bad signal, and employment. The top panel shows both consumption paths
for comparison and the bottom panel shows the consumption path for the optimal monitoring
policy on a much tighter scale to better observe the shifts in consumption.
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